Children aged three, four and five years, drawn equally from one secular and one religious school in Spain, were questioned about the psychological and biological constraints that apply to two different types of person: an ordinary human being (their best friend) and an extraordinary being (God). Children were asked to assess whether: (1) the knowledge available to either being is constrained by perceptual processes and (2) the life cycle of either being is constrained by biological processes. Three year olds provided few signs of distinguishing between the two types of being. Five year olds, on the other hand, were quite systematic in their differentiation. They judged that the knowledge available to a friend-but not to God-would be constrained by the need for perceptual access and they judged that the life cycle of a friendbut not that of God-would be constrained by the biological processes of birth, growth and death. Implications for current accounts of children's conceptual development are discussed.
2001). Consider our conception of God-or of special beings in general. They are typically construed as animate, sentient creatures with preferences and beliefs. Thus, everyday notions of life and mind are projected onto such special beings. Yet they are also often attributed superhuman powers that defy ordinary biological and psychological processes. For example, in the case of God, he can hear our prayers, he knows our thoughts, and he is immortal.
We ask if young children are able to reconcile their growing appreciation of the constraints that apply to human beings with an understanding of God's special powers. Thus, we ask how young children come to realize that God is both omniscient and immortal. Two different predictions can be made about children's insight into God's exceptional status. First, children's naı¨ve theories, whether in the domain of physics, biology or psychology, might be difficult to subvert (Evans, 2001; Mayr, 1982; Profitt & Gilden, 1989) . Thus, if children are told that God is immortal or omniscient, they might balk at such assertions insofar as they contradict children's naı¨ve theory about human constraints. This prediction is consistent with research suggesting that young children are prone to anthropomorphize God (Elkind, 1970; Goldman, 1964; Gorsuch, 1988) .
A different prediction can be derived from recent theorizing in cognitive anthropology (Boyer, 2001; 1994; Boyer & Walker, 2000; Evans, 2000; Sperber, 1985) . If a given religious ontology recurs across different social groups and is relatively stable within any particular group, it is likely to possess ''survival'' characteristics ensuring its repeated acquisition and transmission. Hence, it is reasonable to speculate that children rapidly grasp religious ontologies and the violations that they imply.
Current developmental research offers little evidence to help decide between these competing expectations. However, Barrett, Richert, and Driesenga (2001) recently obtained evidence for the second view outlined above: young children did not over-extend their emerging grasp of restrictions on human knowledge to special beings, such as God. They recognized his special cognitive powers. The study to be described sought to build on these findings in two ways. First, the claim that children readily accept that God has counter-intuitive capacities would be strengthened if it could be demonstrated in another domain. Accordingly, children were interviewed not just about God's special cognitive powers but also about his life cycle. Second, to reinforce the claim that young children regard God as extraordinary, they were asked to justify their forced-choice replies.
A final goal was to assess the potential contribution of explicit religious teaching to children's conception of God. Children were recruited from a Catholic school that included religious instruction and worship in the curriculum and a secular school that excluded both.
METHOD Participants
A total of 72 children was tested. Half came from a private school in Madrid with no religious worship or instruction. Half came from a private, religious school in Madrid in which religion and religious worship were a regular part of the curriculum. All children came from predominantly middle-and upper-middle-class homes. The 36 children from each type of school were equally divided into three age groups: 3-year-old children (mean = 3 years 5 months; range = 36 to 46 months); 4-year-old children (mean = 4 years 4 months; range = 48 to 59 months); and 5-year-old children (mean = 5 years 4 months; range = 60 to 70 months). Children within each age group were randomly divided into two subgroups: six children were tested for their understanding of a friend and six children were tested for their understanding of God. One 4-yearold girl from the non-religious school who was tested for her understanding of God failed to complete the questions. Accordingly, the final analyses were based on a total of 71 children.
Procedure
Each child received two tests: the ''omniscience'' test and the ''immortality'' test, with order of presentation systematically varied across children. Each test was designed to assess children's appreciation that (1) knowledge and life are restricted rather than unrestricted for human beings whereas (2) special beings, notably God, may escape such restrictions. For each test, children were questioned about either an ordinary person, namely a best friend, or about a special being, namely God. The two tests were similar in structure despite differences in content. Each included forced-choice questions followed by requests for a justification. We describe the omniscience test and then the immortality test.
Omniscience
The child was shown a gift-wrapped box, and asked the following questions: 
Immortality
Children were posed the following questions (a picture of a dinosaur accompanied the first question):
7 What will happen to _____ a long, long time from now? Will _____ die or will s/he go on living for ever and ever? 8 Depending on children's reply to question 7, they were asked to provide a justification: OK, _____ will die. Why is it that s/he will not go on living for ever and ever? or OK, _____ will go on living for ever and ever? Why is it that s/he will not die?
RESULTS
The results for the omniscience test will be presented first followed by the results for the immortality test. For each test, we report two sets of findings:
(1) children's replies to the forced-choice questions; and (2) an analysis of the pattern of responding made by individual children to the justification questions.
Omniscience test
Forced-choice questions. Questions 1 and 5 of the omniscience test offered children a forced choice between attributing and denying ignorance to the target. (Replies to question 3 were not analyzed because the same answer (''Smarties'') was expected whether the target was a friend or God.) Table 1 shows the mean number of times (out of a total of two questions) that children attributed ignorance to the target as a function of age, target (friend versus God) and school. Table 1 shows that ignorance was attributed more often to the friend than to God. This target effect is especially evident among 5-year-old children. A three-way ANOVA of Age 6 Target 6 School revealed main effects of age (F(2, 60) = 9.02, p 5 .001) and target (F(1, 60) = 11.045, p 5 .001), a two-way interaction of Age 6 Target (F(2, 60) = 3.48, p 5 .037) and a three-way interaction of Age 6 Target 6 School (F(2, 60) = 3.260, p 5 .045). Further analysis of the simple effect of target for each of the six combinations of age and school confirmed what is apparent from inspection of Table 1 : differentiation between the friend and God was consistently found for children in both types of school only among 5 year olds (3 year olds, nonreligious school, F(1, 60) = 14.34, p 5 .001; 3 year olds, religious school, F(1, 60) = 2.016, ns; 4 year olds, non-religious school, F(1, 60) = .14, ns; 4 year olds, religious school, F(1, 60) = 3.58, ns; 5 year olds, non-religious school, F(1, 60) = 18.15, p 5 .001; 5 year olds, religious school, F(1, 60) = 5.59, p 5 .05). In summary, irrespective of schooling, 5 year olds systematically distinguished between the two targets but 3 and 4 year olds, did not. The one exception to this pattern-namely the target effect obtained for 3 year olds attending a non-religious school-will be reconsidered in the discussion.
Patterns of individual responding to the justification questions. Questions 2, 4 and 6 invited children to give justifications. Justifications were allocated to one of three categories: (1) perceptual constraints (references to perceptual constraints on knowledge, e.g., ''He will have to guess because he can't see it''); (2) extraordinary processes (attributions of knowledge to the target based on extraordinary processes or special powers, e.g., ''Because He is magic'', ''Because He has very big eyes and He can see everything''); and (3) uninformative (irrelevant or uninformative justifications, e.g., ''He will know because I have the Star Wars sword'' or ''Just because''). The first and second authors independently coded the justifications of 30% of the children, drawn approximately equally from each of the subgroups. There was agreement for 92% of the justifications coded (N = 63). Disagreements were resolved by discussion. The first author coded all the remaining children.
Individual children were allocated to one of four categories: (1) perceptual only; (2) mixed; (3) extraordinary only; and (4) unclassified. Criteria for allocation to each of these categories were as follows:
1 Perceptual only-children were allocated to this category if they: (1) offered at least one perceptual constraints justification and (2) never offered any extraordinary processes justifications. 2 Mixed-children were allocated to this category if they mixed justifications by offering: (1) at least one perceptual constraints justification and (2) at least one extraordinary processes justification.
3 Extraordinary only-children were allocated to this category if they:
(1) offered at least one extraordinary processes justification and (2) never offered any perceptual constraints justifications. 4 Unclassified-children were allocated to this category if they failed to offer either a perceptual constraints or an extraordinary processes justification.
The number of individual children falling into each of these four categories is shown in Table 2 as a function of age and type of target. (Because no consistent effect of schooling was observed in the preceding analysis, children in Table 2 were not subdivided in terms of schooling.) Table 2 shows first that several 3 year olds failed to offer any justifications and were therefore unclassified. Second, all classified children, irrespective of age group, mentioned only perceptual constraints when talking about their friend. Finally, fewer children displayed this exclusive focus on perceptual constraints when talking about God. Fisher exact probability tests confirmed that although this target effect was not significant for 3 or 4 year olds it did reach significance for 5 year olds (p 5 .01). Despite this differentiation between the two targets, especially by 5 year olds, it should be noted that children often gave mixed justifications when talking about God.
Immortality test
Forced-choice questions. Questions 1, 3, 5 and 7 gave children a choice between attributing and denying mortality (including, birth, aging and death) to the target. Table 3 shows the mean number of times (maximum = 4) that children attributed mortality to the target as a function of age, target (friend versus God) and school. Inspection of Table 3 shows that, irrespective of schooling, mortality was attributed more often to the friend than to God, especially among 5-year-old children. This pattern emerged irrespective of school type. A three-way ANOVA of Age 6 Target 6 School confirmed the main effects of age (F(2, 60) = 12.07, p 5 .001) and target (F(1, 60) = 40.34, p 5 .001) and the interaction of Age 6 Target (F(2, 60) = 8.003, p 5 .001). There were no other main effects or interactions. Further analysis of the interaction of Age 6 Target confirmed that differentiation between the friend and God was absent among 3 year olds but systematic among 4 and 5 year olds (3 year olds, F(1, 60) = 1.58, ns; 4 year olds, F(1, 60) = 8.78, p 5 .01; 5 year olds, F(1, 60) = 45.93, p 5 .001).
Patterns of individual responding to the justification questions. Questions 2, 4, 6 and 8 invited children to provide justifications. Justifications were allocated to one of three categories: (1) biological constraints (references to biological constraints on the target's lifecycle, e.g., a 5 year old said that her friend did not exist when dinosaurs were on earth because: ''Her mother still wasn't born''); (2) extraordinary processes (references to extraordinary processes permitting a violation of such constraints, e.g., ''God did exist a long time ago because he has always been in Heaven'' or ''God will never die because he is special and he can't die''); and (3) uninformative (where children offered an irrelevant or uninformative justification, e.g., ''He has always been four because I saw him and he was not at home-only his parents were there''). As for the omniscience test, the first and second author independently coded the justifications of 30% of the children, drawn equally from each of the subgroups. There was agreement for 83% of the justifications coded (N = 84). Disagreements were resolved by discussion.
The first author coded all remaining children. Individual children were allocated to one of four categories: (1) biological only; (2) mixed; (3) extraordinary only; and (4) unclassified. Criteria for allocation to each of these categories were as follows:
1 Biological only-children were allocated to this category if they: (1) offered at least one biological constraints justification and (2) never offered any extraordinary processes justifications. 2 Mixed-children were allocated to this category if they mixed justifications by offering: (1) at least one biological constraints justification and (2) at least one extraordinary processes justification. 3 Extraordinary only-children were allocated to this category if they:
(1) offered at least one extraordinary processes justification and (2) never offered any biological constraints justifications. 4 Unclassified-children were allocated to this category if they failed to offer either a biological constraints or an extraordinary processes justification.
The number of individual children falling into each of these four categories is shown in Table 4 as a function of age and type of target. Because no effects of schooling were observed in the preceding analyses, children were not subdivided in terms of this variable. Inspection of Table 4 shows that several children, especially in the 3-year-old group, failed to offer any justifications and were therefore unclassified. Second, classified children mostly mentioned only biological constraints when talking about their friend. Fewer children displayed this exclusive focus on biological constraints when talking about God. Fisher exact probability tests confirmed that this target effect was not significant for 3 year olds but reached significance for 4 year olds (p 5 .01) and 5 year olds (p 5 .02). Despite this differentiation between the two targets, children often gave mixed justifications when talking about God. This pattern is similar to that obtained for the omniscience justifications.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three main findings emerged. First, in both tests, older children were more likely than younger children to differentiate between the two targets. Thus, 5 year olds systematically recognized mortal constraints on human knowledge and life but treated God as an exception. Second, this developmental pattern did not vary with schooling. Third, although 5 year olds clearly distinguished between their best friend and God, they did not justify God's exceptional status exclusively in terms of his extraordinary powers. Below, we discuss each finding in more detail.
In their forced-choice replies, 3 year olds typically gave similar replies for their best friend and God; 4 year olds tended to distinguish between the two targets but only in the immortality test; and 5 year olds distinguished between them in both tests. Children's developing ability to distinguish between their best friend and God was also apparent in their justifications. Whereas 3 year olds focused on mortal constraints, whether referring to their best friend or God, some older children, particularly at 5 years of age, mentioned extraordinary powers when discussing God but almost never did so when discussing their best friend.
The observed age change extends the findings of Barrett et al. (2001) . Children's increasing differentiation between human beings and God is not restricted to their respective psychological capacities-it extends to their biological characteristics. Moreover, children's justifications strengthen the claim that God is not simply seen as different from human beings, but as someone extraordinary.
The target effects that emerged in each interview depended on a comparison between two separate groups of 12 children in each age group. A larger sample would presumably reinforce the target effect observed among older children. It might also uncover some differentiation between human beings and God among 3 year olds. However, a similar failure by 3 year olds to distinguish between a human being and God was reported by Barrett et al. (2001) across four separate studies, each with a relatively large sample size and a within-subjects comparison. These considerations suggest that there is an important age change between 3 and 5 years in children's appreciation of the constraints that apply to ordinary mortals as compared to God.
We may now consider the impact of schooling. Recall that schooling had no significant effect, with one exception. In answering the forced-choice questions in the omniscience interview, 3 year olds in the secular school (but not 3 year olds in the religious school) were more likely to attribute ignorance to their friend than to God. However, this differentiation by 3 year olds in the secular school was not borne out in the rest of the interview. In general-irrespective of schooling-3 year olds showed little sign of distinguishing between their friend and God. Certainly, the results offer no grounds for concluding that children who receive a religious, as compared to a secular education, show an accelerated recognition of God's special status. Recall that 5 year olds displayed a clear differentiation between their best friend and God, irrespective of schooling. These findings support the proposal made by cognitive anthropologists: insight into God's special status is easily transmitted across generations (Evans, 2000) without formal instruction. How might such learning come about?
In a predominantly Catholic country such as Spain, where all the children were tested, it is likely that statements and actions implying God's special status would be observed even by children receiving no religious education. For example, children would sometimes see people praying to God. Those who pray act as if God will hear the prayers even in the absence of any clear indications of God's perceptual access to the prayers. In addition, children are likely to be told that when people die God receives them in Heaven, implying that God's existence extends beyond the temporal limits governing any one human life. It remains to be seen whether children growing up in communities with limited informal exposure to the Christian conception of God, would display a similar developmental pattern.
We may now consider the finding that children rarely conceive of God as having only extraordinary powers. Recall that few 4 and 5 year olds gave exclusively extraordinary justifications with respect to God. Instead, a common pattern was to mention both mortal constrains and extraordinary powers. This mixed pattern suggests that older preschool children start to acknowledge God's special status but do not fully analyze the implications of that status. They fall back on the default assumption that God is subject to perceptual and biological processes in much the same way as an ordinary human being. This default assumption is also found among adults. When adults in India and the United States were explicitly questioned about various deities, they correctly acknowledged the extraordinary powers of the deity in question but in reading short stories, they often interpreted the actions and utterances of the deity as subject to ordinary human constraints (Barrett, 1998; Barrett & Keil, 1996) .
Overall, it is likely that there is an increasing ability with age to recognize God's special status in a consistent fashion. Thus, 5 year olds begin to acknowledge that special status but not in any exhaustive fashion. Adults acknowledge God's special status more comprehensively, especially when questioned explicitly. Despite this age change, however, routine assumptions about the constraints on almost all other sentient beings are not completely set aside in thinking about God. Instead, they persist as an underlying default that is invoked by adults in the course of unreflective processing. Thus, even adults do not suppress all anthropomorphic thinking when making judgments about God.
Finally, we may ask how older children, particularly 5 year olds, conceptualize God's special status. They might conceive of God as having an immaterial nature that renders him immune to ordinary psychological and biological constraints. Alternatively, they might think of him as a superhero, someone who physically resembles ordinary humans but is also endowed with various superhuman powers that allow him to circumvent mortal constraints. These competing interpretations may be tested by asking children about God's visibility. If children think of God as immaterial, they should acknowledge that God might be present among us and observe our actions, despite remaining unseen. Alternatively, if children think of God as an extraordinary but embodied being, they should conclude that we cannot see him because he exists elsewhere rather than among us. Whatever the outcome of these further investigations, the present results show that young children are receptive to theological claims. This is not altogether surprising if we remember that religious thinking has ancient roots in human history. 
